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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
This article supports growing calls to ‘take small states seriously’ in the international 
political  economy but  questions  prevailing  interpretations  that  ‘smallness’  entails 
inherent qualities that create unique constraints on, and opportunities for, small states. 
Instead, we argue that discourses surrounding the ‘inherent vulnerability’ of small 
states,  especially  developing  and  less-developed  states,  may  produce  the  very 
outcomes that are attributed to state size itself.     By presenting small states as a 
‘problem’  to  be  ‘solved’,  vulnerability discourses  divert  attention  away from  the 
existence  of  unequal  power  structures that,  far  from  being the  ‘natural’  result of 
smallness, are in fact contingent and politically contested.   The article then explores 
these themes empirically through discussion of small developing and less-developed 
states in the Commonwealth and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), considering 
in particular how smallness has variously been articulated in terms of what small 
states either cannot or will not do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
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It is now two decades since Richard Higgott called for the ‘non-hegemonic study’ of 
International Political Economy (IPE) in order to take more account of the smaller 
states that make up the overwhelming majority of states in the international system.
1
 
As  Lee  notes,  the  dominance  of  realist  and  neo-realist  approaches  in  IPE  and 
 
International  Relations  (IR)  meant  that analysis  was  largely restricted  to  a  rather 
narrow empirical base, one mostly confined to exploring the experiences, interests, 
concerns and behaviours of major powers in the international system.
2      
In recent 
years, however, there has been growing recognition that small states ‘matter’ – not 
least on the grounds that states should be explored in all of their diversity.
3     
In this 
article, we support calls to pay greater attention to small states in the international 
economy and agree that there are conceptual and theoretical advantages to including 
small states in the analysis of world politics.  In contrast to prevailing interpretations, 
however, we do not do so on the grounds that smallness has inherent qualities that 
create unique constraints on, and opportunities for, small states.   Instead, we argue 
that greater attention needs to be devoted to discourses of smallness and, more 
specifically, how ‘smallness’ is frequently articulated in terms of what small states 
either cannot, or will not, do. 
 
 
 
The article is structured as follows.  In the first section, we provide a broad overview 
of the small states literature.   We suggest that pre-existing debates have tended to 
focus on smallness as a material reality and, more specifically, have sought to 
interrogate what that material reality both  is and does (that is, on the nature and 
consequences  of  smallness  for  states).    While  we  fully  appreciate  the  important 
insights  that  have  been  generated  by this  scholarship,  in  the  second  section  we 
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nevertheless  offer  an  alternative  reading  of  smallness  especially  as  it  relates  to 
developing and less-developed countries (LDCs).   Rather than treating smallness as 
an  analytical  category,  we  propose  that  it  can  be  understood  as  a  discursive 
construction  that  yields  material  effects.      More  specifically,  we  contend  that 
discourses   surrounding   the   ‘inherent   vulnerability’   of   small   states,   especially 
developing  and  less-developed  states,  may  produce  the  very  outcomes  that  are 
attributed to state size itself.    For, vulnerability discourses appear to present small 
states as a ‘problem’ to be ‘solved’, thus detracting attention away from the existence 
of unequal power structures that, far from being the ‘natural’ result of smallness, are 
in fact contingent and politically contested (including by small states themselves).  In 
the third and fourth sections, we explore these themes empirically through discussion 
of small developing and less-developed states in the Commonwealth and the World 
Trade  Organisation  (WTO).    In  particular,  we  consider  how  smallness  in  these 
organisations has variously been articulated in terms of ‘can’t do, won’t do’.
4   
That is, 
while a logic of no alternative is frequently appealed to with respect to small states’ 
 
vulnerability – that is, the notion that small states ‘can’t do’ anything other than 
pursue certain political-economic strategies due to the pressures of inexorable external 
constraints – some small states are nevertheless seeking to resist such logics by 
articulating a ‘won’t do’ narrative instead. 
 
 
 
Small states debates 
 
 
 
 
A number of IR and IPE scholars have recently signalled their dissatisfaction with the 
traditional focus on major powers in international affairs by highlighting the need to 
take small states seriously.
5    
They note how small states have largely been ignored 
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except in relation to major powers and are often conceived in terms of what they are 
not:  they are not ‘great powers’ (nor indeed ‘middle powers’).6   Dissatisfied with this 
lack of substantive theorising regarding ‘smallness’, scholars have sought to locate 
and interrogate its ontological status.     In so doing, they have posited a range of 
competing (and sometimes contradictory) definitions.    For some, smallness can be 
treated as a fixed concept relating to such factors as population size, geographical area 
or GDP per capita.  Once a certain quantitative limit is reached, a state can no longer 
be  considered  'small'.     Others,  however,  have  noted  that  such  definitions  are 
essentially  arbitrary:  who  is  to  say,  for  example,  that  small  states  should  be 
categorised in demographic terms rather than in terms of economic or geographic 
size?
7    
And if population size does indeed hold the key, where should the threshold 
 
lie: one million, three million, fifteen million?
8   
Some have sought to address these 
issues  by deploying  a  combination  of  criteria:  Crowards,  for  instance,  combines 
population size, land area and total income and uses cluster analysis to classify 79 
countries as 'small'.
9         
Others, however, reject fixed definitions altogether on the 
grounds that smallness is inherently relative as a concept. 
10      
Gabon, for example, 
might be classed as a 'small state' if compared to Sudan but as a 'large state' if 
compared to Equatorial Guinea.   Such an approach views 'smallness' in qualitative 
rather than quantitative terms: rather than treating size as a variable to be measured, 
scholars are instead concerned with rather more intangible concepts such as power, 
influence and self-image in order to interrogate states' relationships with their external 
environment.
11      
That  said,  the  ‘relative’  perspective  has  been  criticised  by those 
preferring a ‘fixed’ approach on the grounds that it is ambiguous by nature and thus 
difficult to apply empirically, with advocates of the ‘relative’ perspective in turn 
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retorting  that  the  ‘fixed’  approach  is  more  arbitrary  and  thus  less  intellectually 
rigorous.
12
 
 
 
 
Related to these debates about definition, there has also been considerable controversy 
within the small states literature about impact of ‘smallness’ on states.    For some, 
small states are more weak, exposed and vulnerable than their larger neighbours: in 
economic terms (due to their inability to exploit increasing returns to scale, their high 
levels of trade openness and their exposure to volatility in international market price 
levels); in security terms (due to their lack of military resources, thus giving them 
little  option  but  to adopt either  neutrality or  dependence  on protective  allies); in 
environmental terms (due to their vulnerability to natural disasters and the effects of 
manmade environmental damage); and so on.
13   
Given that most states categorised as 
‘small’ are developing countries and small island economies, it is not surprising that 
 
this ‘underdevelopment’ characteristic generally leads to the predominant view that 
smallness is a constraint on economic success and, in particular, a barrier to 
development.    Small states are thus frequently viewed as dependent and peripheral, 
with their small economies seen as unable to withstand the pressure of a globalising 
world  economy where  large  states  and  businesses  compete  for  new  and  existing 
markets.   Small states are also traditionally seen to have little, if any, influence on 
rule-making in the international political economy even where they build strategic 
alliances, and are treated as marginal actors in major global governance regimes such 
as the WTO, the IMF and World Bank, and the G20.
14
 
 
 
That said, conventional narratives that 'small is dangerous'
15  
have certainly not gone 
unchallenged, not least on the grounds that some small states have flourished just as 
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well as their larger neighbours.
16      
For example, Easterly and Kraay note that some 
small states are wealthier than some larger states in terms of GDP per head, whereas 
Dahl and Tufte claim that they are more democratic and homogeneous.
17    
An (albeit 
limited) number of small state studies thus anticipate a greater significance of small 
states in the international political economy to that of permanent underdevelopment, 
passive followers, or nuisance spoilers.     Smallness is thus not always seen as an 
insurmountable problem, as in the examples of the economic success of small island 
states in the 1990s, as well as the more recent development of Mauritius.
18    
Scholars 
also  note  that  small  states  have  also  frequently found  ways  of  overcoming  their 
weakness in relation to major powers (for example, in international economic regimes 
such as United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the 
WTO),  with  smallness  identified  as  the  common  thread  tying  strategic  coalitions 
(such as the Small Islands States coalition group in the WTO) together.  This has, in 
turn, led to discussions as to whether small states should be treated differently from 
larger ones.  For some, the fact that small states experience unique challenges means 
that they cannot simply be treated as diminutive versions of their larger neighbours. 
Rather, their special status and concerns should be reflected in international rules, 
norms and procedures.  For others, small states are no different from larger states and 
should be treated as such.
19
 
 
 
 
Smallness as a discursive construction 
 
 
 
 
There is thus considerable debate about the nature and impact of smallness.   Yet, as 
Mosser notes, this preoccupation with defining 'smallness' as an analytical category 
leaves the literature vulnerable to the claim that it has little else to offer.
20 
Indeed, the 
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obsession with definition may do more harm than good – not least because it may 
actually serve to close off the small states literature from broader debates within IR 
and IPE.  For the small states literature, the question of 'what is small?' is central; for 
the rest of IR and IPE the response tends to be 'who cares?' 
 
We wish to argue, however, that the small states literature does potentially have a 
great deal to offer IR and IPE.  As Smith, Pace and Lee note, these fields have seen a 
discernible epistemological shift away from actors (i.e. states) and realist concepts 
(i.e. interests) towards social processes (i.e. discourse) and constructivisms (i.e. ideas, 
identities).     They write: ‘Rather than being preoccupied with the epistemological 
status of small states, we can open up the space to consider the political discourses 
that generate certain preconceptions of smallness, and the relationship between these 
discourses   and   small   states’   identities   based   around   specific   practices   of 
“smallness”’.
21    
Crucially, this opens up opportunities to shift away from a focus on 
‘smallness’ as an analytical category and instead to view it in discursive terms.  For, 
 
whether or not a concept is useful in analytical terms, it may also wield significant 
discursive power.
22    
As we shall argue, particular understandings and articulations of 
smallness themselves yield powerful material effects for small states. 
 
We   suggest   that   'smallness'   can   be   read   rather   differently   from   prevailing 
interpretations that treat it as a material reality to be uncovered and interrogated.
23   
As 
outlined above, scholars have tended to focus both on what 'smallness' is (i.e. the 
nature of  smallness)  and what ‘smallness’  does (i.e.  on the consequences of  that 
nature).   So, we now have a wealth of scholarship on small states that both tries to 
define the 'essence' of smallness (for example, by considering whether it refers to 
states  with  populations  under  a  certain  threshold,  so  on)  and  seeks  to  establish 
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whether or not that 'essence' leads to inherent vulnerabilities.  In contrast, we suggest 
an alternative reading of smallness in which smallness is understood as a (set of) 
discourse(s) rather than as a material ‘fact’ or analytical category.   For, if we accept 
that ‘words … don’t just describe the world, they actually help make the world’,24 
then the language of smallness can be seen to make the world of small states.  As we 
explore below, the dominant language is one of vulnerability and weakness.  As such 
the language of smallness sets the contours of what is politically and economically 
possible  and what is not.     The discourse of smallness  provides the  language of 
opportunity and constraint within which small states are situated in the international 
political economy. 
 
Our alternative reading, then, is one that places discourses of smallness at the very 
heart of understandings of 'small states'.  This is not just because we see the category 
of small states as discursive in and of itself – that is, it constitutes (rather than simply 
describes) the ‘reality’ of certain states as ‘small’ and others not (and, for that matter, 
certain bodies as ‘states’ and others not).25      It is also because such discourses may 
produce the very effects that are attributed to the ‘essence’ of smallness.  In particular, 
we  suggest  that  discourses  of  ‘inherent  vulnerability’  present  small  states  as 
‘problems’ to be ‘solved’ and, as such, detract attention away from uneven power 
relations (and, indeed, material inequalities) in the international political economy. 
Such  inequalities,  we  argue,  need  not  be  seen  as  the  ‘natural’  consequence  of 
smallness but can instead be viewed as the contingent outcome of political strategies 
pursued  by state  actors.
26      
We  do  not  deny that  discourses  of  vulnerability and 
weakness reflect the relative structural power (and, hence, the material conditions) of 
many small states in the international political economy, but we contend that they 
prescribe small state internal policies and external behaviour consistent with that 
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language of vulnerability.    Put another way, the discursive construction of smallness 
can be understood as a prescription for (as opposed to simply a description of) small 
states (or, more accurately-put, those states categorised as ‘small’). 
 
 
 
 
 
Here we explore these issues empirically through discussion of small states in two 
international bodies that have played a central role in promoting discursive practices 
of smallness on the international stage (albeit in rather different ways): the 
Commonwealth and the WTO.   In our consideration of each our intention is not to 
‘prove’ empirically that discourses of smallness matter ‘more than’ material factors, 
for we see this is as a meta-theoretical issue that cannot be resolved empirically.
27
 
Rather than seeking to bracket off discourses from material ‘reality’ in order to treat 
them as (separable) variables, we understand discourses as constitutive of material 
reality.   As such, our aim is not to establish empirically that discourses of smallness 
matter but (having made that prior theoretical commitment/claim) we instead want to 
explore how they matter.  With this in mind, we turn now to the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Can’t do, won’t do’: smallness discourses in the international political economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  Commonwealth  has  long  been  at  the  forefront  of  attempts  to  recognise  and 
promote the ‘special status’ of small states in the international system.28    While other 
international and regional bodies certainly acknowledge the ‘unique’ challenges faced 
by  small  states,  the  Commonwealth’s  desire  to  give  small  states  a  voice  in 
international affairs has emerged not only as a core strategic priority but also as an 
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important badge of self-identification.  (As the Commonwealth General-Secretary put 
it, small states are not just ‘integral to the association’s identity’ but ‘speaking up for 
small states’ is absolutely central to its agenda)29.    In particular, the Report of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Joint Task Force on Small States: Meeting 
the Challenges in the Global Economy (2000) has been hailed as a ‘landmark 
document’ in the Commonwealth’s small states agenda.30        While claims that the 
publication of the report marked ‘the beginning of a new partnership between small 
states and the international community’31  may be overstated, other bodies (including 
the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), WTO, European Union (EU), 
UNCTAD and Regional Development Banks) participated in the production of the 
report  and committed themselves to implementing its recommendations.
32          
This 
represented ‘for the first time’ the formal recognition by the international community 
of small states as a distinctive category with (potentially) distinctive priorities.
33
 
 
 
 
 
 
Crucially,  the  Joint  Task  Force  Report  specified  that  ‘what  makes  small  states 
different’ is ‘their special development challenges’,34 which render them ‘more 
vulnerable’ than larger states.35         More  specifically, the Report highlighted: their 
remoteness  and  insularity;  their  susceptibility  to  natural  disasters;  their  limited 
institutional  capacity;  their  limited  diversification;  their  openness  and  access  to 
external capital; and their poverty.
36    
Reflecting a ‘broad consensus … on the special 
development challenges and vulnerability of small states’,37 the Report made a variety 
of recommendations ranging from the need for individual small states to maintain a 
stable macro-economic environment, to the need for external support and assistance 
from  international  institutions.  In  subsequent  reports,  the  Commonwealth  has 
 11 
 
 
 
 
 
maintained that small states: suffer from ‘peculiarities and natural disadvantages’;38 
are ‘especially vulnerable to external events and susceptible to natural disasters’;39 
experience ‘inherent’ and ‘extreme’ vulnerability;40   and are ‘more exposed to the 
vagaries of external markets’.41 
 
The Commonwealth, then, has played a leading role in highlighting the specific 
development needs of small states on the international stage.   Yet, as laudible as the 
Commonwealth’s efforts to emphasise small states’ vulnerabilities may seem, such 
discourses should also be viewed within the context of other dominant discourses and, 
in particular, those surrounding neo-liberal globalisation.    Indeed, the language of 
vulnerability  has  often  been  explicitly  been  articulated  in  terms  of  the  severe 
challenges and constraints presented by globalisation.  For example, as Shahid Javed 
Burki, the first World Bank co-chair of the Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank 
Task Force, argued at the 1999 St. Lucia conference, small states ‘must take full 
advantage of the rapid globalisation of trade and finance.  They cannot opt out of the 
system’.
42     
Similarly, in the foreward to a 2001 report, the Rt Honourable Owen 
Arthur,  Prime  Minister  of  Barbados,  pointed  to  the  ‘profound’  challenges  of 
 
globalisation: ‘We are now at a crossroads where the increasing trend towards 
globalisation could overwhelm the economies of many small states’43  – claims that 
have been reiterated in subsequent reports.
44     
Other reports have highlighted how 
 
globalisation exposes small states to ‘intensive competition’, meaning they have little 
choice but to adjust to it.
45          
As such, globalisation has been appealed to as an 
inexorable economic logic for small states to adapt to, as opposed to a contingent 
political project for states to forge.
46
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This is not to suggest that small states are presented as passive objects of deterministic 
structures; quite the contrary: the ultimate responsibility for small states’ prospects 
and performance is articulated as lying with small states themselves.    Thus, while 
Burki emphasised the challenges of globalisation, he also commented that: ‘It would 
be helpful to recognise that ultimately it is the strength of domestic policies that 
counts in promoting development’.
47   
Subsequent reports have similarly claimed that 
‘the   development   challenge   is   to   exploit   the   opportunities   [of   globalisation] 
 
successfully’48  and that developing countries and LDCs can only reduce poverty ‘if 
they pursue sound economic policies’.49    More recently, a 2008 report urged that: ‘In 
order  to  become  fully  integrated  into  the  global  economy  and  increase  their 
competitiveness,  it  is  essential  that  small  states  implement  policies  that  promote 
economic development and ensure compliance with international best practices and 
regulations’.50      The underlying logic of such discourses is clear: for small states to 
succeed, they must take responsibility for their own fates.   While the international 
community may wish to support them in doing so, smallness is ultimately a problem 
that small states themselves must overcome. 
 
The above examples are, of course, merely illustrative, but they highlight how 
international policy elites in the 1990s and 2000s used a language of vulnerability and 
constraint in the context of globalisation debates to argue that small states’ policy 
options were limited to a neo-liberal agenda (including policies such as trade 
liberalisation, re-regulation and financial monetarism).   Thus, it is possible to argue 
that the language of smallness to some extent became a language of ‘can’t do’ and a 
practice of compliance with dominant economic norms.   The discourse of smallness 
was used to argue for a limited set of policy opportunities available to solve the 
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material condition of being a small state, to obscure other policy possibilities, and to 
 
(re)produce dominant discourses surrounding neo-liberal globalisation. 
 
 
 
At the same time, however, policy elites have also used the discourse of smallness to 
argue for a practice of smallness (such as alliance-building and appeals to fairness and 
special and  differential  treatment) in  various international  economic regimes  as a 
solution to the political condition of being a small (read: weak) state.   As we shall 
discuss in the next section, small developing states have been particularly vocal in the 
WTO  and  have  used  discourses  of  smallness  to  create  possibilities  to  challenge 
existing unequal power structures (together with the consequent unfair decision- 
making practices within the organisation).   Small developing states and LDCs have 
made appeals to fairness in both trade rules and rule-making processes to overcome 
the difficulties of smallness and, in so doing, have encouraged a ‘crisis discourse’ 
within the WTO.
51    
According to this crisis discourse, small developing country and 
LDC practices in the WTO have led to the repeated breakdown of multilateral trade 
 
liberalisation during the current Doha Round. In this discourse, small states are no 
longer  weak  and  vulnerable  but  are  ‘won’t  do’  countries,  according  to  Robert 
Zoellick, the US Trade Representative at the WTO Cancun Ministerial Meeting.
52
 
The  discourse  of  smallness  in  the  international  context  has  led  to  a  practice  of 
 
defiance over international trade rules and practices, an issue to which we now turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Won’t do another bum deal 
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Small state defiance is increasingly relevant to multilateral trade negotiations and has 
played a significant part in the continued impasse in the Doha Round (2001 to-date). 
This is because small states have become ever more active and noisy in the WTO in 
the last decade.   Indeed, small state discourses of defiance and appeals to fairness – 
particularly in the agricultural negotiations – have been a key factor in the ongoing 
delay in completing the Round.
53  
In principle the Doha Declaration that was agreed 
and used to launch the Doha Talks in 2001 is meant to promote the development of 
 
developing and less-developed countries and address the negative impact of trade 
liberalisation and deregulation on the world’s poorest of countries. Negotiations have 
been slow-going largely as a result of developing countries’ resilient approach. They 
want to avoid signing another ‘bum deal’, as Ostry has described the 1995 WTO 
Uruguay – and the current stalemate in the negotiations centres on the unwillingness 
of developed countries to offer significant reductions in their trade-distorting 
agricultural subsidies and developing countries’ reluctance to offer greater access to 
their industrial and service sectors.
54  
A recent mini-ministerial in September 2009 
followed by a full Ministerial in late November-early December 2009 failed to break 
 
this stalemate, with the Doha Round continuing to drag on and the crisis discourse 
persisting.   The current state of play in the WTO is that developing countries insist 
that unless agreement is reached on agricultural market access and non-agricultural 
market access (NAMA) then negotiations on the other key issues (the priorities of the 
major developed countries) services, trade in environmental goods and services, and 
trade facilitation will not take place. Small developing countries (SDCs) and LDCs 
‘won’t do’ negotiations on these latter issues without significant concessions from 
major powers on what they see as key development issues. 
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Although the developing countries in the WTO are led by large countries such as 
India, Brazil, and South Africa through influential strategic coalitions such as the 
Group of Twenty (G20) and the Africa Group, SDCs are also playing a key role in 
holding back the negotiations. Some SDCs such as Burkina Faso and Tanzania were 
invited by the WTO Secretary General to the mini-ministerial in Delhi in September 
2009, recognition perhaps of the need to include this hitherto overlooked category of 
member-state into the formal negotiating process.  Other examples include Mauritius 
–  as  leader  of  the  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  Group  (ACP)  –  and,  most 
successfully perhaps, the so called “Cotton Four” (C4) – a highly active group of four 
African states, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali.   Within the WTO, these states 
have become highly visible participants in the negotiations and, in the case of the C4 
particularly,  proponents  of  a  ‘won’t  do’  bargaining strategy.  This  group  of  small 
LDCs have successfully challenged the process of the agricultural negotiations in 
general, and the cotton talks in particular, by developing normative discourses on fair 
trade and development. They are of course helped in the matter by the naming of the 
current round of WTO talks as the Development Agenda which creates high levels of 
expectation that the Round will directly address the interests of developing countries 
and any agreement will facilitate their economic development. It is within this 
environment of normative claims of development that SDCs and LDCs have been 
able to challenge larger member-states such as the US on the grounds that existing 
American agricultural policies are unfair because they prevent the economic 
development of some of the poorest countries in the global economy and also infringe 
existing WTO rules on domestic subsidies. The C4 and other LDCs  have successfully 
linked  the  issue  of  agricultural  subsidies  to  a  broader  normative  agenda  of 
development and trade liberalisation. These states are not making demands for radical 
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trade policy. Rather, they are winning the normative argument by simply demanding 
that  the  US  and  others  implement  the  Uruguay agreements  on  agricultural  trade 
liberalisation they signed up to in 1995 and yet continue to sidestep.  The ‘won’t do’ 
approach of the C4 is underpinned by a normative discourse that enables these small 
states to capture the moral and ideological high ground and gain material effects as a 
result.  The  discourse  of  trade  liberalisation  and  development  is  important  in 
mobilising other states and non-state actors within the WTO in support of the ‘won’t 
do’ approach.  Developing country strategic coalitions such as the Africa Group, the 
ACP Group and the G20 have actively obstructed moves by the US and other major 
powers  to  complete  the  Doha  Round  without  concessions  in  agriculture.
55   
Non- 
governmental organisations such as Oxfam have also been mobilised in support of the 
 
C4, producing detailed research supporting the claim that American cotton subsidies 
harm the development of these small West African states.
56  
In addition, civil groups 
have been active in US capitols, lobbying media companies in particular, to highlight 
the negative impact of cotton subsidies on poverty in West Africa.
57
 
 
The C4 began their challenge to the major powers in the Doha talks in 2003 with the 
launch  of  a  Cotton  Initiative,  which called  for  sweeping reductions in  developed 
country domestic subsidies in cotton.
58   
American and, to a lesser extent, European 
domestic cotton subsidies encourage higher levels of production of cotton which in 
turn  lowers  world  prices.
59    
These  artificially  created  lower  prices,  which  have 
impacted upon West African farmers by reducing their competitiveness because they 
cannot  compete  fairly with  American  and  European  cotton  farmers.
60            
Despite 
increasing levels of cotton productivity in West Africa, income from cotton exports 
has fallen by over a third during the Doha talks.
61  
In sum, American and European 
domestic subsidies prevent other countries like the C4 from gaining fair access to 
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large markets such as China. In order to address this issue West African states have 
clearly developed defiant discourses and praxis within the WTO. 
 
What  is  significant  for  our  analysis  of  small  states  in  the  international  political 
economy is that,  by launching a  trade liberalisation  offensive  in  the  form  of the 
Cotton Initiative, the C4 successfully placed their policy priorities on the agenda of 
the Doha talks and, during the last seven years of the negotiations, have continued to 
make  ‘a  nuisance  of  themselves’62   in  pursuit  of  an  end  to  developed  country 
agricultural  protectionism.  During more  than  seven  years  of  intensive,  high  level 
multilateral trade negotiations the C4 have managed to headline cotton as a key issue 
in  the  Doha  Agenda  and  prevented  the  larger  member-states  from  marginalising 
LDCs' interests on  agricultural  liberalisation at  the expense of  developed country 
priorities in industrial market access and liberalisation of services. The ‘won’t do’ 
strategy of the C4 is one of the factors that has delayed completion of the Doha Round 
as these African states have resisted continued attempts by larger states to accept an 
trade deal without the concessions in cotton they doggedly demand. While small state 
defiance on cotton in the Doha talks has not, as yet, resulted in tangible outcomes by 
way of  meaningful  shifts  in  US  or  EU  agricultural  trade  policy,  it  has  at  least 
transformed the negotiating and decision-making process of the WTO.
63
 
 
In another highly visible case of small state defiance in the WTO, and one that began 
in 2003 at the same time the Cotton Initiative was launched, Antigua took on the US 
using  the  Dispute  Settlement  Mechanism  over  the  issue  of  internet  gambling.  In 
March 2003 Antigua submitted a complaint that US federal and state policies on 
internet gambling and betting services prevented Antiguan gambling services from 
operating  in  the  US  market  and  infringed  article  XXIII  of  the  WTO  General 
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Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
64 
After months of fruitless bilateral 
negotiations with the US, Antigua finally requested the WTO to set up a dispute 
panel, appealing to widely held values of trade liberalisation. In 2004 this panel found 
in  favour  of  the  Antiguan  complaint  and  a  subsequent  American  appeal  in  2005 
failed.
65      
Antigua’s defiant stance towards the US meant that it was able to extract 
concessions  from  a  much  larger  and  purportedly  more  powerful  WTO  member- 
state.
66      
The Antiguan case provides an interesting case of how a small state can 
successfully adopt a discourse of smallness to underpin an offensive strategy and 
demonstrate, in Cooper’s words an ‘unanticipated power of agency’ in its relations 
with a larger state.
67
 
 
During the Doha Round developing states and LDCs have not always been weak and 
marginalized, as recent studies of small WTO member-states suggest.
68  
Increasingly, 
as the cotton and internet gambling cases indicate, small ‘size’ does not always mean 
small ‘impact’ and that defiance praxis and discourse offers small states possibilities 
of effective diplomatic action. In both cases a discourse of smallness in the WTO 
provided   widely-agreed   liberal   policy  solutions   to   the   problem   of   American 
protectionism and linked this to appeals to commonly-held international values on 
development.  It  also  provided  the  basis  for  elite  coordination  at  national  and 
international levels, and translated their arguments into a common moral language 
that mobilised civil support in support of agricultural and services trade liberalisation. 
 
Small  states  have  come  a  long  way from  being  the  object  of  international  trade 
negotiations and have increasingly imposed themselves on the WTO decision-making 
process in order to influence trade policy outcomes. While most scholars have 
explained this increasing influence in terms of the enhanced bargaining capacity and 
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negotiating leverage that is gained by creating strategic coalitions,
69  
we feel that the 
case of the cotton dispute in the WTO demonstrates that such coalitions are built on 
new defiant discourses of smallness that have united LDCs in obstructing larger and 
supposedly more powerful member-states.  In the internet gambling case Antigua did 
not  have  to  build  a  coalition  to  increase  its  material  power  vis-à-vis  the  US.  It 
developed a discourse of smallness linked to liberal trade policy values to generate 
material effects in their relations with larger states. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
In this article we have called for more attention to be devoted to smallness  as a 
discursive (as opposed to analytical) category when thinking about the experiences 
and status of small states in the international political economy.   Interestingly, this is 
something  that  Peter  Katzenstein  highlighted  some  twenty-five  years  ago  in  his 
seminal  work,  Small  States in  World  Markets.
70          
Yet,  as Katzenstein has since 
lamented, while the book’s ‘most important’ insight was that perceptions of smallness 
and vulnerability were what ‘really mattered’ when looking at small states, it was 
precisely this insight that has received the least attention in subsequent reviews and 
discussions of his work.
71       
This article has argued that discourses of smallness do 
indeed matter – and thus warrant closer attention – not least because discourses yield 
material effects.  In particular, we have argued that discourses of smallness appear to 
‘naturalise’ unequal relations of power that, in turn, do indeed render some states 
more weak, exposed and vulnerable than others.   More specifically, we have argued 
that discourses of inherent vulnerability must be seen within the context of dominant 
discourses of neo-liberal globalisation in which globalisation has been viewed as an 
inexorable economic logic rather than as a project that is ‘contingent, contested and 
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above all authored politically’.72    Globalisation is thus conceived as a harsh material 
reality that small states must adapt to through ‘good’ policies, rather than as a political 
project – and, for that matter, a political project that has (arguably) produced the very 
inequalities between ‘large’ and ‘small’ states that are attributed to the innate 
disadvantages  of  smallness  itself.     It  is  both  ironic  and  convenient,  then,  that 
discourses of smallness/vulnerability allow the  responsibility for ‘development’ to 
shift away from the international community and towards small states themselves. 
Yet, as we have outlined, some small states have actively challenged the neo-liberal 
globalisation agenda precisely by maintaining that they are not ‘the problem’ to be 
‘solved’.  Rather, coalitions such as the Africa Group have sought to hold the US and 
 
EU to account by presenting them as ‘the problem’ (not least with respect to their 
 
‘your liberalise, we subsidise’ approach).   As such, small states have sought to re- 
articulate smallness in terms of defiance rather than constraint – or, as we have put it, 
in terms of what they will not, as opposed to cannot, do. 
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